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Turkish Competition Law: October 2026 Review

October 2026 marked a period in which significant decisions and developments concerning cartels, horizontal and vertical restraints, abuse of dominance, competition concerns in digital markets, and behavioural obligations were brought to public attention in Turkish competition law.

The decisions of the Turkish Competition Board published during this period addressed a broad range of anticompetitive practices, from indirect exchanges of information through common suppliers and collusive pricing in public procurement to territorial and customer allocation and de facto exclusivity arrangements. The applicable standard of proof, the distinction between horizontal and vertical infringements, limitation periods, the application of more favourable fining provisions, and the permissible scope of non-compete obligations featured prominently in the Board's legal assessments.

Decisions concerning settlement procedures, commitments and interim measures also demonstrated the Board's continued use of different enforcement tools to protect the competitive process. Developments involving digital platforms, online advertising, the optical sector and labour markets further illustrated the expanding scope of competition law enforcement.

This review examines the principal decisions and developments published or announced in October 2026, focusing on their legal reasoning and implications for Turkish competition law enforcement.

I. Competition Law Infringement Decisions

1. Hub-and-Spoke Cartel in the Retail Sector: Indirect Information Exchange and the Standard of Proof

Decision No. 26-11/343-130 of 2 April 2026

The Turkish Competition Board (the “Board”) examined allegations that undertakings operating in the retail sale of small household appliances had coordinated their prices through a common supplier, addressing significant issues concerning hub-and-spoke cartels.

The investigation focused on communications relating to Fakir and De’Longhi branded products and the pricing behaviour of the retailers concerned. The evidence revealed that certain retailers had complained to their common supplier about competitors offering lower prices and had made their own price increases conditional upon corresponding increases by their competitors.

The Board assessed the supplier's transmission of these requests to other retailers, together with its monitoring of subsequent price changes, as relevant to the establishment of indirect coordination among competing undertakings. The retailers' expectation that their requests would be communicated to competitors and that price increases would be implemented reciprocally was also considered significant in establishing the infringement.

One undertaking argued that its prices had been determined independently through the observation of competitors' publicly available prices. However, the Board rejected this defence in light of the content of the communications and the fact that, for certain products, the undertaking had adjusted its prices before its competitor. The fact that some contemplated price increases had not ultimately been implemented did not alter the Board's assessment of the existence of an agreement and/or concerted practice.

A particularly noteworthy aspect of the decision concerns the applicable standard of proof in competition law infringements. In response to the argument that the infringement should be established beyond reasonable doubt, the Board considered the applicability of the balance of probabilities and clear and convincing evidence standards to competition infringements subject to administrative fines.

In this context, the Board considered it sufficient to demonstrate, through clear, consistent and concrete evidence, that the infringement was more likely to have occurred than not. Rather than assessing each item of evidence in isolation, it adopted a holistic approach to the communications and pricing conduct.

The Board consequently concluded that participation in an agreement and/or concerted practice amounting to a hub-and-spoke cartel constituted an infringement of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (the “Law”) and imposed an administrative fine on the undertaking concerned.

The decision demonstrates that direct communication between competing undertakings is not indispensable for establishing anticompetitive coordination. Depending on the circumstances, the indirect transmission of competitively sensitive information through a common supplier may provide grounds for finding a horizontal competition law infringement.

2. Collusive Bidding and Price Coordination in Public Procurement

Decision No. 25-49/1206-681 of 25 December 2025

In an investigation concerning allegations of jointly determined offer prices in the supply of chlor-alkali products to public authorities, the Board examined the competition law implications of commercial relationships between a supplier and its resellers.

The communications obtained during the investigation showed that resellers had forwarded requests for price quotations received from public authorities to their supplier and consulted the supplier when determining the offers they intended to submit.

The Board established that these practices were not limited to final tender bids but also extended to quotations requested by public authorities for the purpose of calculating estimated procurement costs.

The Board emphasised that the existence of a vertical supply relationship did not preclude the supplier and its resellers from being competitors in particular procurement processes. Where both the supplier and its resellers submitted offers for the same public procurement contract, they competed with one another, and their commercial relationship could not justify the joint determination of offer prices.

Although requesting authorisation documents from manufacturers for participation in public tenders was regarded as a legitimate commercial practice, the Board also considered that such procedures could be used to facilitate collusive bidding or tender allocation.

No evidence was identified establishing a direct agreement among the resellers themselves. However, the supplier was involved in all communications forming the basis of the infringement finding. Accordingly, the Board assessed the infringement through the supplier's separate bilateral relationships with different resellers.

The Board found an infringement of Article 4 of the Law and imposed administrative fines, taking into account the supplier's more active role in the coordination when determining the sanctions.

The decision illustrates that anticompetitive coordination in public procurement may arise not only through the submission of final tender bids but also through price quotations provided during the preliminary stages of procurement, including the determination of estimated costs.

3. Territorial and Customer Allocation in the Cement Sector: Distinguishing Horizontal and Vertical Infringements

Decision No. 26-09/278-99 of 12 March 2026

The Board investigated territorial and customer allocation practices among competing producers in the grey cement sector, together with restrictions imposed by manufacturers on their dealers.

Sales and supply-related communications obtained during the investigation indicated that one producer had entered into arrangements concerning territorial and/or customer allocation with two different competitors. Having assessed the nature of the arrangements, the markets concerned and their timing, the Board concluded that they constituted a single infringement in respect of that producer.

By contrast, another producer's customer allocation arrangement with a competitor and its restrictions on the territories and customers to which its own dealers could sell were treated as two separate competition law infringements.

The Board explained that allocation agreements between competing producers restricted inter-brand competition, whereas territorial and customer restrictions imposed on dealers affected intra-brand competition.

Accordingly, practices implemented during relatively close periods could constitute separate infringements where they affected different competitive relationships and involved distinct forms of restriction.

As a result, administrative fines were imposed on three producers for territorial and customer allocation, while an additional fine was imposed on the producer that had implemented vertical restrictions on its dealers.

Dissenting opinions questioned whether the available evidence was sufficient to establish an infringement of Article 4 of the Law.

The decision highlights that determining the number of infringements requires consideration not merely of the temporal proximity of the conduct, but also of the legal nature of the restrictions, the competitive relationship between the parties and the level of competition affected.

4. Customer Restrictions in Cargo Services: Limitation Periods and More Favourable Fining Provisions

Decision No. 26-06/180-69 of 19 February 2026

Following judicial proceedings concerning an earlier infringement decision, the Board reassessed customer restrictions imposed in connection with the resale of cargo and logistics services.

The communications examined during the investigation revealed instances in which quotations had been withheld because a customer was regarded as belonging to another undertaking, or deliberately high prices had been offered to discourage the customer from accepting the quotation.

The Board characterised the relationship between the parties as vertical, since the logistics undertakings resold services acquired from the supplier.

Although certain customer restrictions had been implemented reciprocally, the Board concluded that the power to determine and enforce those restrictions primarily rested with the supplier.

Consequently, the resellers concerned were not held liable for the infringement, whereas Yurtiçi Kargo's restrictions on sales to its own customers were found to infringe Article 4 of the Law.

The decision also included significant assessments concerning limitation periods and the application of former and current fining provisions.

The Board accepted that the applicable eight-year limitation period had expired in relation to conduct evidenced by a communication dating from 2009 and therefore excluded that conduct from the sanction.

With regard to the infringement established on the basis of the remaining evidence, the Board compared the former and current fining regulations and maintained the amount of the fine imposed in the earlier decision, taking into account the application of more favourable provisions and the prohibition of reformatio in peius.

Beyond the assessment of vertical customer restrictions, the decision is particularly relevant to the application of limitation periods, the principle of lex mitior and the prohibition of reformatio in peius in competition law proceedings following judicial review.

5. De Facto Exclusivity and Anticompetitive Foreclosure in the Optical Sector

Decision No. 25-48/1166-654 of 18 December 2025

Following the annulment of an earlier infringement decision by the administrative courts, the Board reassessed contractual arrangements and commercial practices implemented by an undertaking operating in the optical sector.

The investigation concerned the manufacture and wholesale of ophthalmic lenses, the manufacture and distribution of machinery and equipment used by opticians, and the wholesale supply of contact lenses.

The Board examined arrangements under which opticians were provided with machinery free of charge or at discounted prices in exchange for commitments to purchase a specified value of lenses.

These arrangements were assessed in conjunction with long-term purchasing targets and contractual obligations. The possibility of recovering the machinery where purchasing commitments were not fulfilled, together with a reduction in purchases from competing suppliers during the contractual periods, supported the Board's conclusion that the practices created de facto exclusivity.

The Board considered that the contractual and commercial conditions encouraged opticians to direct their purchases towards a particular supplier and produced exclusionary effects that made it more difficult for competitors to operate in the market.

It consequently found an infringement of Article 6 of the Law and concluded that commitments previously made binding in connection with a merger clearance had also been breached.

When reassessing the administrative fine under Article 16 of the Law, the Board compared the former and current fining provisions and applied those more favourable to the undertaking.

The Board also examined the rules concerning repeated infringements, accepting that liability arising from an infringement committed before a merger could continue within the merged undertaking.

Dissenting opinions questioned whether the sanction was sufficiently deterrent and adequate to ensure compliance with the binding commitments.

The decision demonstrates that commercial advantages linked to long-term purchasing obligations may, under certain circumstances, result in de facto exclusivity. It also illustrates that a merger does not automatically extinguish liability arising from previous competition law infringements.

II. Settlement Decisions

1. Joint Price-Setting and Coordination of Sales Conditions in the Seedling Sector

Decisions Nos. 26-19/569-214, 26-19/570-215, 26-19/571-216 and 26-19/572-217 of 21 May 2026

The Board investigated allegations that competing undertakings operating in seedling production and sales had jointly determined prices and commercial terms, examining the exchange of competitively sensitive information and coordinated pricing practices.

WhatsApp communications obtained during the investigation revealed that competing producers had prepared common price lists and jointly determined payment terms and discount rates.

The Board established that the arrangements extended beyond the initial determination of prices. Compliance with the agreed pricing terms was also monitored through the identification and warning of producers offering lower prices.

The communications included evidence concerning the joint determination of cash and deferred-payment prices, the transmission of agreed commercial terms to certain producers outside the messaging group, and the monitoring of prices applied in different geographic areas.

The Board also examined bilateral communications and meetings to assess whether undertakings that were not members of the common messaging group had participated in the arrangements.

It ultimately found that four undertakings had infringed Article 4 of the Law by jointly determining prices and sales conditions with their competitors.

Following the undertakings' acknowledgement of the existence and scope of the infringements under the settlement procedure, their administrative fines were reduced by 25%.

The decisions demonstrate that horizontal coordination may concern not only prices themselves but also payment terms and discount rates. Mechanisms established to monitor compliance with agreed commercial conditions may also constitute significant evidence when assessing the existence and implementation of anticompetitive arrangements.

2. Mutual Negative Keyword Matching in Online Advertising

Decision No. 26-16/456-166 of 30 April 2026

The Board assessed an arrangement between two competing undertakings operating in online consumer electronics retailing concerning the mutual use of negative keywords in Google advertising, under Article 4 of the Law.

The investigation established that the parties had added each other's brand names and variations to their negative keyword lists. Where advertisements continued to appear, the parties communicated with one another and modified their advertising settings.

Evidence concerning the removal of a competitor's brand name from a Google Performance Max (PMax) campaign was also considered relevant to demonstrating the implementation of the arrangement.

The Board examined the practices from the perspective of trademark protection.

In this context, it distinguished between an undertaking refraining from using a competitor's registered trademark as an advertising keyword and competitors entering into a reciprocal arrangement to prevent their advertisements from appearing in searches containing each other's brand names.

Since negative keyword matching restricted advertisement visibility in searches containing the relevant brand names irrespective of the context of those searches, the Board considered that the arrangement went beyond the protection afforded by trademark law.

The Board concluded that the agreement to mutually restrict the appearance of advertisements in searches involving each other's brands infringed Article 4 of the Law.

The investigation was concluded through settlement in respect of the settling undertaking, and its administrative fine was reduced by 25%.

The decision demonstrates that reciprocal restrictions on advertising visibility between competitors cannot automatically be justified by reference to the protection of trademark rights and remain subject to competition law scrutiny.

III. Interim Measures and Commitment Decisions

1. The Scope and Limits of Non-Compete Obligations in Joint Ventures

Decision No. 26-23/698-283 of 30 June 2026

The Board examined a non-compete obligation contained in the shareholders' agreement of a joint venture operating in the electronic money and payment services sector, following an application for individual exemption under Article 5 of the Law.

The non-compete clause had been invoked against co-branded card and cashback projects pursued by one of the joint venture's shareholders, extending its application beyond the activities actually carried out by the joint venture.

Arbitration proceedings and claims for substantial contractual penalties based on the clause were also considered evidence of its actual enforcement.

The Board emphasised that the scope of a non-compete obligation could not be determined solely by reference to the broadly defined corporate objects contained in the joint venture's articles of association.

Instead, such obligations had to remain connected to, and within the limits necessary for, the joint venture's actual activities.

In this context, the Board identified strong indications that extending the non-compete obligation to payment services outside the joint venture's activities could prevent the development of new commercial projects and that the restriction did not satisfy the conditions applicable to ancillary restraints or individual exemption. The Board considered that the conduct could restrict competition within the meaning of Article 4 of the Law.

The Board further assessed whether the continued enforcement of the non-compete clause during the investigation could delay the market entry of new payment models and weaken potential competition.

Accordingly, interim measures were imposed pursuant to Article 9(4) of the Law.

The measures restricted certain applications of the non-compete obligation specified in the decision, including its extension beyond the period of joint control, to investments that did not confer control, and to payment services outside the joint venture's actual scope of activities.

The decision illustrates that the compatibility of non-compete obligations in joint venture agreements with competition law must be assessed not only by reference to contractual wording but also in light of the joint venture's actual economic activities, the necessity of the restriction and its potential effects on competition.

2. Interim Measures Against Potential Exclusionary Practices in the Instant Noodle Market

Decision No. 26-35/988-419 of 23 September 2026

The Board imposed interim measures in an investigation concerning alleged exclusionary practices and dealer restrictions by an undertaking operating in the instant noodle market under the Indomie and Supermie brands.

The investigation concerned suspected infringements of Articles 4 and 6 of the Law.

Documents obtained during the investigation revealed commercial practices involving the provision of free products to retail outlets, budgets intended to facilitate the delisting of competing products, promotional support and incentives relating to shelf visibility.

The Board considered that there were strong indications that these practices were being used to remove competing products from retail outlets and reserve shelf space for the undertaking's own products.

The undertaking's market share, brand recognition, financial strength and position as an early entrant into the market were also taken into account when assessing the risk that existing and potential competitors might face difficulties obtaining access to a sufficient number of retail outlets.

The Board concluded that the continuation of the practices during the investigation could cause harm to the competitive process that would be difficult to remedy.

It therefore imposed interim measures pursuant to Article 9(4) of the Law.

Under these measures, the provision of free products and the commercial support arrangements specified in the decision was suspended pending the adoption of a final decision.

The measures were not confined to incentives expressly conditional upon the removal of competitors' products but extended more generally to the commercial benefits identified in the decision.

Although the decision does not constitute a final finding of infringement, it illustrates the role of interim measures in preventing potentially irreversible harm to competition and restricting suspected exclusionary practices before an investigation is concluded.

3. Continued Application of Commitments Concerning Automated Pricing in Digital Marketplaces

Decision No. 26-11/344-131 of 2 April 2026

The Board examined a request to lift commitments previously made binding in relation to an automated pricing mechanism used in multi-category online marketplace services.

In its application, Trendyol relied on decisions concerning similar pricing mechanisms operated by other digital platforms and differences between the obligations imposed on those platforms.

The Board stated that the discontinuation of automated pricing practices by other platforms did not eliminate the risk of price coordination among sellers on Trendyol's own marketplace.

In particular, the Board distinguished the circumstances of another platform whose commitments had become redundant following the complete discontinuation of the relevant automated pricing mechanism.

The Board emphasised that competition concerns must be assessed in light of each undertaking's own practices and that there was no obligation to impose identical commitments on different platforms.

It consequently rejected the request to lift the commitments and maintained the obligations previously made binding under Article 43 of the Law.

However, the reporting arrangements were modified following the suspension of the implementation of the relevant provision of the Communiqué concerning monitoring by an independent auditor.

Compliance reports would therefore be submitted directly by the undertaking rather than by an independent auditor.

The decision demonstrates that the continued application or removal of commitments in digital markets depends on whether the competition concerns arising from the specific undertaking's practices persist, rather than on the treatment of other market participants.

IV. Other Significant Developments Announced in October 2026

1. Investigation into Collusion in Wood Purchase Tenders Concluded

Decision No. 26-38/1045-445 of 15 October 2026; Authority announcement of 26 October 2026

The Turkish Competition Authority (the “Authority”) announced the conclusion of an investigation into allegations that MDF and particleboard producers had engaged in collusive conduct as buyers in wood sale tenders organised by the General Directorate of Forestry.

The investigation had previously been concluded through settlement in respect of six undertakings.

The Board subsequently found that the remaining undertaking had also infringed Article 4 of the Law and imposed an administrative fine.

The investigation demonstrates that competition law enforcement is not limited to price-setting and market allocation practices among sellers. Coordination among buyers concerning purchasing conditions and tender procedures may likewise constitute an anticompetitive agreement.

2. Investigation Launched into Ten Undertakings in Catering Service Tenders

Decision No. 26-37/1006-M of 8 October 2026; Authority announcement of 19 October 2026

The Board launched an investigation into ten undertakings operating in the catering services sector over suspicions that they had engaged in collusive conduct in public procurement tenders, potentially infringing Article 4 of the Law.

The information and documents obtained during the preliminary inquiry were considered sufficiently serious to warrant the opening of a full investigation.

The investigation will examine whether the undertakings coordinated their bidding behaviour in public procurement procedures in a manner capable of restricting competition.

The initiation of the investigation does not constitute a definitive finding that the undertakings concerned have infringed competition law.

3. Commitments Accepted in the Optical Sector Concerning Discounts, Bundled Sales and Data Use

Decision No. 26-35/980-414 of 23 September 2026; Authority announcement of 9 October 2026

A separate investigation concerning an undertaking operating in the optical sector under Articles 4 and 6 of the Law was concluded following the Board's acceptance of commitments and its decision to make them binding.

The commitments submitted by EssilorLuxottica addressed discount policies, bundled sales arrangements, purchasing obligations and the use of commercially sensitive information relating to competing opticians.

Under the commitments, the undertaking agreed, for a period of three years, not to apply discounts to Atasun on sales of branded sunglasses and branded optical frames that differed from those offered to other opticians in Türkiye. It also undertook not to structure promotional campaigns on terms that only Atasun could satisfy.

With respect to bundled agreements involving ophthalmic lenses and lens-edging machines, the duration of lens purchasing commitments would be limited to a maximum of 18 months for a period of two years.

The undertaking also committed to expressly stating in its contracts that opticians were not subject to an exclusive purchasing obligation.

During the same two-year period, the undertaking agreed not to provide discounts on contact lens purchases under new ophthalmic lens agreements.

Regarding data use, the undertaking committed, for a period of three years, not to share with Atasun information concerning competing opticians obtained through counters installed in lens-edging machines.

The Board made the commitments binding under Article 43 of the Law and concluded the investigation.

The decision illustrates the use of the commitments mechanism to address competition concerns arising from different commercial practices, particularly discount structures, bundled sales, exclusive purchasing arrangements and the use of commercially sensitive data.

4. Settlement in a Labour Market Competition Investigation

Decision No. 26-30/899-383; Public Disclosure Platform announcement of 12 October 2026

An investigation into alleged anticompetitive practices in labour markets involving undertakings operating in banking, finance and other sectors was concluded through settlement in respect of one bank.

The investigation concerned allegations of no-poach agreements and/or exchanges of competitively sensitive information under Article 4 of the Law.

According to a disclosure published on Türkiye's Public Disclosure Platform (KAP) on 12 October 2026, the proceedings concerning Akbank were concluded through the settlement procedure, with an administrative fine of TRY 1,713,897,558.

The public disclosure did not provide details of the specific conduct attributed to the undertaking.

The development illustrates that competition law enforcement is not confined to product and service markets. Practices capable of restricting employee mobility, influencing employment conditions or affecting competition in labour markets may also fall within the scope of Article 4 of the Law.

V. Subsequent Development in November 2026

Investigation Launched into Seven Undertakings in the Hazelnut Purchasing Market

Turkish Competition Authority announcement of 6 November 2026

The Turkish Competition Authority announced the opening of an investigation into seven undertakings operating in the hazelnut purchasing and sales sector.

Following the preliminary inquiry, the Board decided to investigate whether the undertakings had infringed Law No. 4054 by coordinating hazelnut purchase prices and procurement policies in a manner capable of influencing price formation in the market.

The investigation will also examine whether one of the undertakings complied with commitments made binding by the Board's decision No. 24-12/213-87 of 7 March 2024.

The commitments concern the 2024, 2025 and 2026 hazelnut purchasing seasons and include an obligation not to purchase in-shell hazelnuts below the reference price announced by the Turkish Grain Board, a maximum purchasing volume of 100,000 tonnes in each hazelnut season, and a minimum purchasing volume of 45,000 tonnes during the September–December period of each year.

The investigation is relevant both to potential coordination of purchasing prices and procurement policies among competing buyers and to the Authority's monitoring of compliance with previously binding commitments.

At this stage, the opening of an investigation does not constitute a finding that the undertakings concerned have infringed competition law.

Overall Assessment

The decisions and developments made public during October 2026 demonstrate that Turkish competition law enforcement continues to address traditional cartels and anticompetitive agreements while increasingly examining digital markets, vertical commercial relationships, labour markets and behavioural obligations.

Indirect exchanges of information through common suppliers, coordination of prices and commercial conditions among competitors, collusion in public procurement, territorial and customer allocation, and de facto exclusivity remain significant competition law risks requiring careful consideration in corporate compliance programmes.

At the same time, the Board's assessments concerning the standard of proof, limitation periods, more favourable fining provisions and the distinction between horizontal and vertical infringements highlight the importance of procedural safeguards and principles governing administrative sanctions alongside substantive competition law rules.

Decisions concerning settlement procedures, commitments and interim measures further demonstrate the availability of different enforcement mechanisms beyond final infringement decisions.

In particular, interim measures may serve to prevent harm to the competitive process that would be difficult to remedy, while commitment decisions provide a mechanism for addressing competition concerns through binding behavioural obligations.

Taken together, these developments underline the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach to competition law compliance. Undertakings should not limit their compliance efforts to direct interactions with competitors but should also assess their relationships with suppliers and distributors, pricing and discount policies, digital advertising practices, purchasing and sales commitments, data-sharing arrangements and employment policies.