07 Kas 2026Turkish Competition Board Imposes Interim Measures on Google’s AI Services
The Turkish Competition Board (the “Board”), in its decision dated 8 October 2026 and numbered 26-37/1000-423, decided to impose interim measures following its examination of Google's practices concerning the use of news publishers' content in AI Overviews and AI Mode.
The decision examines Google's dominant position in the general search services market and whether its practices towards news publishers may constitute discriminatory or exploitative abuse. In particular, the Board focused on the selection of news publishers as sources in AI-generated answers, contractual terms offered to publishers, and the economic effects of content use.
Assessment of Google's Dominant Position
The Board first examined Google's position in the general search services market. In this assessment, the following factors were considered:
- Google's strong and long-standing market position and the limited market shares of its competitors;
- Significant network effects arising from the multi-sided nature of general search services;
- User habits, brand recognition, and Google's financial resources;
- High barriers to market entry and the absence of countervailing buyer power.
Based on these factors, the Board concluded that Google holds a dominant position in the general search services market.
Following this finding, Google's practices were examined under Article 6 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition, with separate assessments of their discriminatory and exploitative effects.
Assessment of Discriminatory Abuse
Google's practices towards news publishers were examined under two main areas: the selection of publishers as sources in AI services and their inclusion in the Pilot Agreement.
Selection of publishers as sources
- Comparability: Five news publishers containing the same essential factual information were found to be in comparable positions because their content supported the information presented in an AI Mode answer.
- Different treatment: Some comparable publishers were shown as sources, while others were not. The Board considered that Google's explanations did not provide a clear and objective reason for this difference.
- Ability to distort competition: The Board assessed that answering users' questions directly within AI Mode could reduce traffic to publishers' websites. Publishers not shown as sources could therefore face disadvantages in user access and traffic.
- Objective justification: No technical or objective requirement was identified that would make it necessary to select or exclude a particular publisher as a source.
Participation in the Pilot Agreement
- Comparability: Publishers that had signed an agreement with Google, were in the signing process, or were involved in preliminary discussions were considered to be in comparable positions.
- Different treatment: The criteria used to select publishers for agreements were not applied consistently. Some publishers that did not meet the criteria were included in the process, while other comparable publishers were excluded. In addition, some publishers received standard contractual terms that could not be changed, while others negotiated commercial terms, including the scope and amount of content.
- Ability to distort competition: Publishers with agreements could partly compensate for possible traffic and advertising revenue losses through payments received from Google. Publishers without agreements could face similar losses without receiving this financial benefit. The Board considered that this difference could affect their ability to compete effectively.
- Objective justification: The Board concluded that the criteria used to select publishers and determine payments were not sufficiently transparent, objective, or verifiable to explain the different practices in Türkiye.
As a result, the Board considered that there was strong suspicion that Google's practices were discriminatory under Article 6 of Law No. 4054 and were capable of distorting competition in the market.
Assessment of Exploitative Abuse
Following its assessment of discriminatory practices, the Board examined whether the terms governing the use of publishers' content in AI services could constitute exploitative abuse. Three main issues were considered.
1. Imposition of contractual terms and the opportunity to negotiate
- Google was found to be an unavoidable trading partner for news publishers. The Board considered that publishers' dependence on Google could limit their freedom to decide whether their content should be used in AI services.
- The option to opt out of AI services was introduced approximately six and a half months after the services were launched in Türkiye. Concerns about possible effects on visibility and traffic raised questions about whether publishers could exercise this choice freely in practice.
- The Pilot Agreements were largely based on standard terms. The method used to determine payments was not sufficiently explained. In addition, Google received broad rights to use content while accepting limited obligations. These findings raised concerns about whether the agreements had been genuinely negotiated.
2. Economic effects on publishers and third parties
- The Board considered that AI-generated answers could meet users' information needs directly and reduce visits to publishers' websites, creating a zero-click search effect. Traffic and engagement losses reported by several publishers were also taken into account.
- Providing payments only to publishers that had signed agreements, even though other publishers' content was used in the same AI services, could prevent publishers without agreements from receiving economic benefits from the use of their content.
- The lack of sufficient and verifiable data on content use and user clicks could make it difficult for publishers to assess the value of their content and whether the payments offered were appropriate.
- Small and medium-sized publishers, in particular, could face a choice between allowing their content to be used without payment and leaving AI services while accepting the risk of losing visibility and traffic. The Board considered that this situation could negatively affect the economic sustainability of publishing, content diversity, and consumer interests.
3. Necessity and proportionality of the practices
- The Board stated that the benefits of AI services for users do not automatically make all content-use conditions necessary and proportionate.
- Possible alternatives were considered, including more effective or separate choices for publishers, limits on the scope of content use, and better redirection of users to publishers' websites.
- The Board also examined the broad licence terms covering all Google products, the single-payment structure, and the absence of specific commitments by Google regarding content use or user referrals. These conditions raised concerns about whether the agreements went beyond what was necessary for the operation of AI services.
In this context, the Board considered that there was strong suspicion of unfair trading conditions, as the contractual terms did not sufficiently reflect the scope and economic value of content use or its effects on publishers, and the criteria used to determine those terms were not sufficiently transparent.
Interim Measures and Obligations Imposed on Google
The Board considered Google's dominant position, publishers' dependence on its services, the implementation of existing agreements, and the possibility that similar agreements could cover more publishers.
It was assessed that these circumstances could create serious and irreparable harm to competition during the investigation. Accordingly, the Board decided to impose interim measures under Article 9(4) of Law No. 4054.
Under the decision, Google is required to:
- Avoid discriminatory practices between publishers in equivalent situations that are not based on objective, transparent, and predetermined criteria;
- Conduct effective and good-faith negotiations with publishers seeking content-use agreements and use objective, verifiable, and transparent criteria when determining contractual terms;
- Ensure that publishers are not negatively affected in their ranking, visibility, indexing, or traffic on other Google services because they refuse to sign an agreement or accept its terms;
- Provide publishers with verifiable data on how often their content is used, how it appears as a source, user engagement, and, where possible, traffic directed to their websites;
- Establish technical and commercial mechanisms allowing publishers to opt out of AI services independently of their visibility and indexing in other Google services;
- Refrain from changing existing contractual terms to the disadvantage of publishers or introducing new terms that reduce their existing rights and interests;
- Avoid applying different or additional terms in new or amended agreements that could distort competition between comparable publishers;
- Periodically submit verifiable information and data to the Turkish Competition Authority to demonstrate compliance with the interim measures.
The Board decided that, if these obligations are not fulfilled within three months following notification of the reasoned decision, administrative fines under Article 17 of Law No. 4054 will apply from the end of that period.
Significance of the Decision under Competition Law
The decision is significant because it examines the use of news content in AI-powered search services in the context of digital platforms' market power and the economic dependence of content providers.
The main legal issues include the competitive effects of different conditions applied to comparable publishers, the determination of the economic value of content use, genuine opportunities to negotiate contractual terms, and publishers' ability to opt out of AI services independently of other Google services.
The interim measures do not constitute a final finding of a competition law infringement. Their purpose is to protect competitive conditions while the investigation continues. Nevertheless, the decision shows how commercial relationships between digital platforms and content providers may be assessed under Article 6 of Law No. 4054 as AI services continue to develop.