Sibel ÖZTÜRK, LL.M.
Attorney-at-Law | Partner, Erikel & Partners
The Turkish Competition Board’s (“Board”) decision dated 10 June 2026 and numbered 26-21/637-255 concerns a preliminary inquiry into whether the labour market practices of undertakings operating in the cement sector infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”). In particular, the decision examined whether Baştaş, Bursa Çimento, Çimentaş, Çimsa, Ferçim, Göltaş, Limak, Medcem, Votorantim and Yurtçim had infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054 by exchanging information concerning planned salary increase rates for their white-collar employees.
The preliminary inquiry originated from an internal company correspondence obtained during an on-site inspection conducted in the context of a separate investigation, which contained information concerning competitors’ prospective salary increases. Following the concerns raised by this correspondence, the assessment examined the source of the information, the extent to which the salary increases referred to in the correspondence corresponded with those actually implemented, the undertakings’ remuneration policies over a broader period, and employee mobility within the sector. Ultimately, it was concluded that the labour market practices of the undertakings subject to the preliminary inquiry did not constitute a restriction of competition, and the Board unanimously decided, pursuant to Article 41 of Law No. 4054, not to open an investigation.
The decision is particularly noteworthy for its assessment of internal company correspondence containing prospective remuneration-related information concerning competitors. Rather than relying solely on the presence of such information in an internal document, the assessment addressed its source, compared it against the salary increases actually implemented, and considered the undertakings’ conduct over a broader period.
From Evidence Obtained in a Separate Investigation to a Distinct Labour Market Review
The preliminary inquiry into the labour market did not originate from an application specifically concerning employment practices, but from evidence obtained during an on-site inspection conducted as part of a separate competition investigation. In the investigation initiated against Arkoz Madencilik Enerji Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, Limak and Yurtçim by the Board’s decision dated 21 November 2024 and numbered 24-49/1082-M, correspondence obtained during the on-site inspection conducted at Yurtçim’s Istanbul office on 21 January 2025 raised concerns that certain cement undertakings may have exchanged information concerning planned salary increase rates for their white-collar employees. This finding led to the initiation of a separate preliminary inquiry into the labour market practices of ten undertakings operating in the cement sector.
The procedural background of the decision also demonstrates the significance of on-site inspections for undertakings. In this case, human resources correspondence pointing to a competition law issue distinct from the principal subject matter of the ongoing investigation provided the basis for a separate review.
Competition in Labour Markets and Relevant Market Definition
The decision states that competitive relationships in labour markets may be assessed by reference to competition between undertakings to employ workers with similar qualifications, irrespective of whether those undertakings operate in the same downstream or output market. Accordingly, undertakings that are not competitors in their respective output markets may nevertheless compete with one another in the labour market.
In the present case, having regard to the findings concerning white-collar employees, the Board considered that a relevant market could potentially be defined as the “labour market for cement sales services”. However, since a definitive market definition would not alter the outcome of the assessment, the relevant product and geographic markets were ultimately left open.
Competition Law Framework for the Exchange of Remuneration Information
The decision treats remuneration as one of the principal parameters of competition in labour markets and notes that information concerning fringe benefits, bonuses and other incentive payments, as well as recruitment strategies, may also be competitively significant. The sharing of prospective remuneration intentions and exchanges of current or multilateral remuneration information are identified as practices potentially carrying a higher degree of competition law risk, whereas benchmarking exercises conducted through independent third parties on the basis of anonymised and sufficiently aggregated data may carry a lower degree of risk.
The Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labour Markets further indicate that non-aggregated, current or prospective, non-public information whose source or individual data content can be identified may constitute competitively sensitive information. The correspondence containing prospective salary increase information was considered against this framework. However, the mere presence of such information in internal company correspondence was not regarded, in the circumstances of the case, as sufficient in itself to establish that an exchange of information between competing undertakings had taken place.
The Correspondence Giving Rise to the Concerns: How Were the Prospective Salary Increase Rates Obtained?
The principal finding underlying the preliminary inquiry was an email correspondence dated 1 February 2024 obtained from Yurtçim. The correspondence included a request to gather information on the salary increase rates that cement undertakings were planning to apply to white-collar employees, including engineers, sales and marketing personnel, human resources employees, and middle and senior management. The response stated, in substance, that undertakings generally appeared to be waiting to see what others would do, and then set out various rates, expectations and implementation dates relating to Baştaş, Bursa Çimento, Çimentaş, Çimsa, Ferçim, Göltaş, Limak, Medcem and Votorantim.
The correspondence raised concerns that the undertakings concerned may have shared with Yurtçim the salary increase rates they intended to implement. The assessment, however, did not stop at the fact that this information appeared in the correspondence; it also examined whether the information had been obtained from competing undertakings or through market research. The on-site inspections conducted at the premises of the undertakings subject to the preliminary inquiry did not uncover any evidence demonstrating that competitors had shared their respective salary increase rates with one another. Accordingly, the presence of prospective remuneration-related information concerning competitors in Yurtçim’s internal correspondence was not considered sufficient, in itself, to establish that such information had been obtained from those competitors.
Did the Information in the Correspondence Correspond with the Salary Increases Actually Implemented?
In addition to examining the source of the information, the assessment considered the extent to which the salary increase information contained in the correspondence corresponded with the increases actually implemented. To this end, the rates referred to in the email were compared with the salary increases actually granted to white-collar employees by the undertakings in 2024. It was established that, in the cases of Bursa Çimento, Çimentaş, Çimsa, Ferçim, Göltaş and Medcem, the numerical rates contained in the correspondence did not correspond with the salary increases ultimately implemented.
The estimate of 45–50% relating to Ferçim was considered separately. Although the fact that the actual increase fell within this range could, at first sight, lend support to the accuracy of the information contained in the correspondence, the breadth of the stated range was also taken into account. It was therefore considered possible that the information reflected a sector-wide estimate rather than a competitively sensitive exchange of information between competitors. Accordingly, the assessment considered not only whether the stated figure corresponded with the eventual increase, but also the degree of precision and specificity of the information contained in the correspondence.
Does Accurate Information Necessarily Mean That It Was Obtained from a Competitor?
Not all of the information contained in the correspondence differed from what subsequently occurred in practice. The information indicating that Baştaş and Limak would make retroactive adjustment payments to their white-collar employees in February, and that Medcem would do so in March, was consistent with the actual implementation. Nevertheless, no additional evidence was identified demonstrating that Yurtçim had obtained this information from the competing undertakings concerned.
The assessment also took into account that salary increases are commonly finalised during the first months of the year and that retroactive adjustment payments are a known human resources practice within the sector. In this context, the fact that certain information corresponded with what subsequently occurred was not considered sufficient to establish that the information had been obtained from a competitor through anticompetitive communications. The source of the information and whether it could have been derived from known sector practices were also considered.
This constitutes one of the particularly noteworthy aspects of the decision. In the circumstances of the case, the fact that information proved accurate and the proposition that such information had been obtained from a competing undertaking were not treated as equivalent; the accuracy and source of the information were assessed separately.
Was the Convergence in Salary Increases Sufficient in Itself?
The review was not confined to comparing the information contained in the 2024 correspondence with the salary increases ultimately implemented. The average salary increases granted by the undertakings to their white-collar employees between 2023 and 2026 were also examined. Although a number of undertakings applied salary increases within the 55–60% range in January 2024, other undertakings applied lower increases during the same period.
When considered over the broader period, the salary increase rates implemented by the undertakings were found to differ significantly, and no evidence was identified demonstrating that those rates had been jointly determined. Accordingly, the convergence observed in salary increase rates during a particular period was not sufficient, in the circumstances of the case, to establish that the undertakings had jointly determined their salary increases.
Employee Mobility: What Do Actual Employee Movements Show?
In addition to the findings concerning salary increases, the review considered whether employee mobility between the undertakings had been restricted. Correspondence obtained from Çimentaş showed that the potential recruitment by Çimentaş of individuals who were employed, or had previously been employed, by Limak and Çimsa had been considered. Data submitted by Votorantim also demonstrated that employees had in fact moved between undertakings operating in the sector.
On the basis of these findings, it was concluded that there was no arrangement between Çimentaş, Çimsa, Limak and Votorantim restricting employee mobility. Accordingly, the assessment of employee mobility took into account not only the content of internal company correspondence but also actual employee movements between the undertakings.
Are Remuneration Terms Determined Through Collective Bargaining Agreements Within the Scope of Law No. 4054?
The decision separately addresses the determination of the remuneration and other employment rights of unionised blue-collar employees through collective bargaining. It was established that the remuneration and other employment rights of unionised blue-collar employees in the cement sector were determined under a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) concluded between the Cement Industry Employers’ Association (Çimento Endüstrisi İşverenleri Sendikası – ÇEİS) and the Turkish Cement, Ceramics, Pottery and Glass Industry Workers’ Union (Türkiye Çimse-İş Sendikası).
The assessment emphasised the social function of collective bargaining aimed at improving employees’ working and employment conditions and referred to the legislative reasoning underlying Article 3 of Law No. 4054, according to which labour markets in which collective bargaining applies fall outside the relevant statutory concept. On this basis, it was concluded that the determination of the remuneration and other employment rights of unionised blue-collar employees under the CBA did not fall within the scope of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and that the determination of those terms by undertakings operating in the cement sector within the framework of the CBA did not constitute a violation of competition law.
Conclusion and Assessment
The Board’s decision numbered 26-21/637-255 is noteworthy in that internal company correspondence containing information concerning competitors’ prospective salary increases was not treated as a sufficient basis, in itself, for a final conclusion. The source and accuracy of the information, as well as its relationship with the increases actually implemented, were examined. The review was not confined to the correspondence itself; the undertakings’ remuneration policies over a broader period and actual employee mobility within the sector were also taken into account.
In this context, the assessment considered together the absence of evidence from the on-site inspections demonstrating that competitors had shared their salary increase rates with one another; the fact that a significant proportion of the numerical salary increase information contained in the correspondence did not correspond with the increases actually implemented; and the fact that certain information that proved accurate could not be linked by evidence to competing undertakings and could be explained by sector practices. Data covering the 2023–2026 period further showed significant differences between the undertakings’ salary increases and revealed no evidence that the salary increase rates had been jointly determined.
Ultimately, it was concluded that the undertakings subject to the preliminary inquiry had not engaged in conduct contrary to competition law in relation to their labour market practices. The Board therefore unanimously decided, pursuant to Article 41 of Law No. 4054, not to open an investigation.
The decision is particularly noteworthy for undertakings in two respects. First, human resources correspondence obtained during a separate competition investigation was capable of triggering a distinct competition law review concerning labour market practices. This demonstrates that competition compliance programmes should not be confined to sales and pricing functions; human resources processes, including the manner in which competitor-related remuneration information is obtained, shared and circulated internally, should also form part of an undertaking’s competition compliance framework.
Second, the decision illustrates the importance of considering, in the context of the case as a whole, circumstances such as the presence of prospective remuneration-related information concerning competitors in an internal document, the subsequent accuracy of certain elements of that information, and the implementation of similar salary increases by undertakings during particular periods.
In the present case, the source of the information contained in the correspondence and the extent to which it corresponded with actual practices were examined, while the undertakings’ remuneration policies over a broader period and actual employee mobility within the sector were also taken into account. In this respect, the decision is notable for demonstrating that, in the circumstances of the case, the presence of prospective information concerning competitors in internal company correspondence was not considered sufficient in itself to establish that an exchange of information had taken place.
Overall, decision No. 26-21/637-255 provides a noteworthy example of the competition law risks that undertakings may encounter in their human resources processes in the context of labour market enforcement. The fact that a single piece of internal company correspondence obtained in the course of a separate investigation was capable of triggering a distinct labour market review also underscores that competition compliance is not limited to sales, pricing and commercial decision-making processes: the manner in which human resources functions obtain, share and use information concerning competitors requires the same degree of care.
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