Prepared by Sibel ÖZTÜRK, LL.M., Attorney at Law, and Selenay ESEN, Trainee Lawyer
The decision of the Turkish Competition Board dated 6 November 2025 and numbered 25-41/1016-582 provides important insights into the evolving approach to anti-competitive agreements, particularly in two respects: the liability of third parties contributing to cartel arrangements and the individual liability of managers who exert a decisive influence on the infringement.
The investigation was initiated following allegations that driving schools operating in the Aydın province had established a common pricing structure for course fees, and that this structure was monitored and maintained through the involvement of a consultancy and investigation (detective) company. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Board determined that, although the company in question was not itself active in the market as a driving school, its role in establishing and maintaining the pricing alignment among competitors warranted its qualification not as a peripheral actor, but as a facilitator of the cartel.
Scope and Procedural Background of the Investigation
The findings indicate that the driving schools met at various points in time and agreed on course fees based on licence categories. These agreed price levels were not merely discussed but formalised through written documents, reflecting a mutual understanding that prices would not fall below the determined thresholds.
While a significant number of the investigated undertakings opted for settlement and thereby concluded the proceedings at an earlier stage, the investigation continued under the standard procedure with respect to the consultancy company, leading to a substantive assessment specific to its role.
Price Fixing and the Institutionalised Nature of the Arrangement
The evidence assessed by the Board demonstrates that the arrangement went beyond a simple alignment of prices. Rather, it evolved into a structured system designed to ensure the continuity and effectiveness of the anti-competitive conduct.
In particular, the following elements were identified:
The Board emphasised that such a configuration cannot be regarded as a mere agreement on pricing, but rather as a mechanism that secures the implementation and sustainability of a restrictive arrangement.
Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanism
The case file further reveals that the pricing alignment was not of a recommendatory nature, but was actively monitored and enforced.
In this context:
The Board attached particular importance to these elements, noting that the existence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms reinforces the existence and stability of the anti-competitive arrangement.
The Role of the Consultancy Company: Cartel Facilitation
One of the most notable aspects of the decision concerns the legal characterisation of the consultancy and investigation company.
The Board did not consider the absence of direct market activity as decisive. Instead, it focused on the company’s actual conduct. The evidence demonstrates that the company:
On this basis, the Board concluded that the company could not be regarded as a mere service provider external to the cartel structure, but rather as a facilitator contributing to its functioning.
This approach confirms that liability under Article 4 of Law No. 4054 is not limited to direct competitors, but may extend to third parties that enable or reinforce anti-competitive coordination.
Substantive Assessment Beyond Formal Elements
Another important aspect of the decision is the Board’s treatment of formal elements, particularly the absence of the consultancy company’s signature on certain documents.
The Board reiterated that, for the purposes of Article 4 of Law No. 4054, the notion of an “agreement” is not confined to formal contractual arrangements. It is sufficient that the parties express a concurrence of wills aimed at restricting competition.
Accordingly, the assessment was based on a holistic evaluation of:
This reflects a clear preference for a substance-over-form approach grounded in economic reality.
Nature of the Infringement: Price Fixing
The Board once again underlined that price fixing constitutes one of the most serious forms of competition law infringement.
Agreements between competitors to fix prices are, by their very nature, restrictive of competition. In such cases, it is not necessary to demonstrate actual market effects in detail; the existence of an anti-competitive object is sufficient to establish an infringement.
The decision further illustrates that the presence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms strengthens the assessment of the gravity and sustainability of such infringements.
Individual Liability and Decisive Influence
A further key aspect of the decision is the imposition of an administrative fine on the manager of the consultancy company.
Under Article 16 of Law No. 4054, individuals who exert a decisive influence on the infringement may also be subject to administrative fines. In the present case, the Board found that the relevant manager:
Based on these findings, the Board concluded that the individual had a decisive influence over the infringement and imposed a separate administrative fine.
This aspect of the decision highlights that competition law risks are not confined to corporate entities, but may also extend to individuals involved in decision-making and implementation processes.
Concluding Remarks
This decision reflects a broadening approach in the assessment of anti-competitive agreements, with a clear emphasis on economic reality and functional involvement.
It establishes three key principles:
In this context, undertakings should carefully assess not only their own commercial conduct, but also their relationships with consultants, intermediaries and sectoral coordination mechanisms. Likewise, individuals in managerial positions should be mindful that their role in such structures may give rise to personal liability under competition law.
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